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The paper examines the short-run distributional impact of public education in 
Greece using the micro-data of the 2004/5 Household Budget Survey. The aggregate 
distributional impact of public education is found to be progressive although the 
incidence varies according to the level of education under examination. In-kind 
transfers of public education services in the fields of primary and secondary 
education lead to a considerable decline in relative inequality, whereas transfers in 
the field of tertiary education appear to have a small distributional impact whose 
size and sign depend on the treatment of tertiary education students living away 
from the parental home. When absolute inequality indices are used instead of the 
relative ones, primary education transfers retain their progressivity, while secondary 
education transfers appear almost neutral and tertiary education transfers become 
very regressive. Finally, we use the EUROMOD tax-benefit microsimulation model 
in order to estimate the first-round distributional effects of a graduate tax imposed 
on the current stock of graduates. The main policy implications of the findings are 
outlined in the concluding section. 
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1. Introduction  
Most governments devote considerable economic resources to the provision of public 
social services (education, health, care services, etc.). The prime aim of social services 
is not the redistribution per se, but rather to provide affordable and adequate 
services that satisfy the relevant needs of households.  Yet,they effectively 
redistribute income. In particular, publicly provided education services have been 
strongly associated with income inequality. Indeed, several studies have 
demonstrated that economic inequality can be partly explained by differences in the 
educational status of individuals. Educational differences among individuals 
produce, through the operation of labour markets, unequal distributional outcomes. 
For example, Lemieux (2006) suggests that most of the increase in wage inequality 
between 1973 and 2005 in USA can be explained by increases in the return to tertiary 
education. Therefore, the interest in the field of the distributional effects of public 
education transfers is well justified and, deservedly, has a long tradition in academic 
studies, [Meerman (1979), Jimenez (1986), James & Benjamin (1987), Lampman 
(1988), Evandrou et al. (1993), Smeeding et al. (1993), Selden & Wasylenko (1995), 
Garfinkel et al. (2006), Callan et al. (2008), Marical et al. (2008)].A common finding of 
most of these studies is that public education transfers reduce aggregate inequality, 
yet the effect varies across education levels and considerable country-specific 
differences are observed. 
The Greek context is interesting for several reasons. In Greece, education services are 
provided free of charge by the state at all levels, while the role of formal private 
institution is limited. The high social status of formal education is strongly 
embedded in the perceptions of Greek households. The public education system is 
perceived as progressive per se in the public dialogue and often the underlying 
inequities of this system are neglected. Yet, several scholars have shown that 
inequities exist even in a education system that in principle is designed on the basis 
of free access to all, [Psacharopoulos & Papas (1987), Psacharopoulos (1988), Papas & 
Psacharopoulos (1991), Patrinos (1995), Gouvias (1998), Chryssakis & Soulis (2001), 
Psacharopoulos & Tassoulas (2004), Psacharopoulos & Papakonstantinou (2005), 
Daouli et al. (2010)]. Most of these studies conclude, inter alia, that children of 
parents with better educational qualifications and occupational background are far 
more likely to succeed in tertiary education examinations than students from lower 
socio-economic classes. Despite these findings, the distributional effects of public 
education in Greeceare relatively underscrutinized. Tsakloglou & Antoninis (1999) 
and Antoninis & Tsakloglou (2001) use static incidence analysis for the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s and show that the aggregate effect of public education subsidies is 
strongly progressive, but the progressivity is due exclusively to the effect of primary 
and secondary education transfers. These studies also show that the aggregate 
progressivity of public education subsidies declined between the late 1980s and the 
mid-1990s.Callan et al. (2008) also examine the distributional effects of public 
education in Greece, but from a strictly comparative perspective. 
Since the mid-1990s two very important developments took place. First is the 
massification of higher education. According to the OECD (2006), between 1995 and 
2003 the number of tertiary education students in Greece almost doubled. The 
expansion of tertiary education was mostly triggered by political considerations and 
not by economic reasoning. Second, in the 1990s there was a large increase of the   3
migrant population in the country (many of them with their families). Children from 
a migrant background most probably belong to the low income strata and they 
benefit considerable by the free provision of education. These developments are 
interesting from a distributional perspective and motivate the current study.  
The paper uses the information of the 2004/5 Household Budget Survey (HBS) and it 
is organized as follows. The next section provides a short description of the structure 
of the Greek education system. Section 3 is concerned with methodological issues, 
while section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 presents the simulation of a 




2. A brief overview of the Greek education system 
According to the Greek constitution, education is provided free of charge at all 
levels. A limited number of private schools operate at the first two educational levels, 
whereby enrolment rates fluctuate around 6% for primary and secondary schools. At 
the tertiary level, the degrees offered from private institutions are not officially 
recognized as equivalent to those of public institutions.  
Pre-primary education is not compulsory, while primary and lower secondary are. 
These levels are not diversified. The great majority of lower secondary education 
graduates continue to upper secondary education, which is diversified. Students can 
choose between General and Technical Vocational Upper Secondary Education. 
Graduates of the General Upper secondary Education are eligible to take part in the 
general examinations to enter the Higher Education Institutions, which operate 
under a numerus clausus status. Higher Education Institutions are divided into 
Universities (hereafter AEI) and Technological Education Institutes (hereafter TEI). 
Graduates of Technical Vocational Upper Secondary Education may also enter the 
Technological Education Institutions, either by participating in the general 
examinations or on the basis of their school certificate record. Until the early 1990s, 
about one third of the candidates succeeded in entering Technological Education 
Institutions. After the rapid expansion of tertiary education in the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s, this proportion has risen considerably, but varies considerably between 
faculties. Before entering the labour market, upper secondary education graduates 
can also participate in post-secondary non-tertiary education (hereafter IEK), which 
has a hybrid educational-vocational character. Both private and public institutions 
operate at this level. 
Private demand for higher education is strong. As a result of the households' interest 
in the general examinations a very large number of private, costly crammer schools 
assisting the candidates operate in parallel with the official education system but, in 
fact, substituting it in many respects. Moreover, the operation of numerus clausus in 
Greek higher education institutions and, until recently, the underdevelopment of 
post-graduate studies leads a large number of students to foreign universities. OECD 
estimates suggest that over 50,000 Greek students study abroad, most of them in 
British Universities. The number of Greek students studying abroad is the sixth in 
the OECD (behind South Korea, Germany, Japan, France and Turkey), but by far the 
first when it comes to tertiary students studying abroad per capita.   4
Table 1 provides an overview of the Greek education system in 2004/5 in terms of 
numbers of students (in both public and private schools), total expenditure 
(distinguished between current and investment expenditure) stated in current 2004 
prices and average yearly cost per student attending a public school for each level of 
the education system. Taking into account that investment spending fluctuates a lot 
over time, the estimates for investment expenditures reported in the table are the 
averages (in real terms) of investments during the period 1998-2004. The analysis of 
the distributional impact of public education spending is based on the information 
included in this table. It should be noted that in the case of tertiary education the 
number of students refers to the number of regular students; i.e. students enrolled 
for the number of years required for obtaining a degree (in practice, few students 
graduate exactly on the number of years required for obtaining a degree). Spending 
per student in secondary education is almost 50% higher than the corresponding 
figure in primary education. It is interesting to note the substantial difference in 
spending per student in the two branches of tertiary education. While yearly 
spending per student in Universities is more than twice the average of primary and 
secondary education, spending per student per year in Technological Education 
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Table 1: Number of students and structure of public expenditure in the Greek education system (2004-2005) 
 
 
Sources: Ministry of Education, National Statistic Service of Greece-Education Department 
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Primary  Public  740.167  94.0 1.634.948.193  160.121.571  10.2 1.795.069.764  2.209  2.425 
    Private  47.134  6.0          
    All  787.301  100.0          
Secondary Public  652.346  94.3  2.072.791.866  246.178.877  8.4  2.318.970.742  3.177  3.555 
    Private  39.572  5.7          
    All  691.918  100.0          
IEK  Public 16.233  43.3  40.055.952  33.824.609 1.2 73.880.561  2.468  4.551   
    Private  21.229  56.7          
    All  37.462  100.0          
AEI   225.265b  56.0 919.690.761  508.287.388  1.8 1.427.978.149  4.083  6.339 
TEI   177.229c  44.0 309.708.442  52.807.226  5.9  362.515.667  1.748  2.045 
   All  402.494  100.0                     6
3. Data and general methodology 
The data used in the paper are the micro-data of the 2004/5 Greek Household 
Budget Survey, which was carried out by the National Statistical Service of Greece. 
The survey covers all the private (non-institutional) households of the country and 
its sampling fraction is 2/1000 (around 6,500 households or 18,000 individuals). The 
baseline distribution is the distribution of disposable income. All monetary values 
were expressed in constant mid-2004 values in order to remove the impact of 
inflation. The distributions used are distributions of equivalised household 
disposable income per capita and they are derived using the “modified OECD 
equivalence scales” (Hagenaars et al., 1995) that assign weights of 1.00 to the 
household head, 0.50 to each of the remaining adults in the household and 0.30 to 
each child (person aged below 14) in the household. Since the estimates in the HBS 
are expressed in monthly figures, the cost estimates of Table 1 are adjusted 
accordingly.  
The estimates derived in the next section rely on static incidence analysis under the 
assumption that public education transfers do not create externalities. In other 
words, it is assumed that the beneficiaries of the public transfers are exclusively the 
recipients of the public education services (and the members of their households) 
and that these services do not create any benefits or losses to the non-recipients (i.e. 
the taxes that finance the transfers are already there). Moreover, it is assumed that 
the value of the transfer to the beneficiary is equal to the average cost of producing 
the public education services in the corresponding level of education. We also 
assume that the benefit is shared by all household members (not only the direct 
beneficiary); in other words, we implicitly assume that in the absence of the public 
transfer the burden of financing the provision of education services would be borne 
by the household. Similar assumptions are standard practice in the analysis of the 




4. Empirical results 
The distributional effect of a transfer is the likely outcome of two factors; the location 
of the beneficiaries in the income distribution and the relative size of the transfers. 
The first factor effectively describes the disproportionality of the transfer, namely 
how equal (or unequal) is the transfer distributed to the population. Even if a 
transfer is equally distributed to the population if its size relative to recipients’ 
disposable income is small, then its redistributive effect would be negligible. Section 
4.1 examines the first factor, while section 4.2 measures the relative impact of the 
public education transfers. Then, the analysis moves to the estimation of the impact 
of education transfers in overall inequality (and poverty), which is the core of our 
analysis. 
4.1. Distribution of beneficiaries 
The position of the direct beneficiaries of public education subsidies in the income 
distribution is reported in Table 21. Primary and, especially, secondary education 
beneficiaries are concentrated in the lower half of the income distribution. This is 
likely to be the consequence of two factors. The first factor has to do with 
                                                 
1Population is grouped in quintiles according to their equivalised disposable income.   7
demographics. Households with children are less likely to have reached the top of 
their earnings capacity and/or have a lower share of earners and, hence, are more 
likely to be concentrated in the lower quintiles. The second factor has to do with 
private education. All private education students in the sample belong to the top 
quintiles of the income distribution. The distribution of post-secondary non-tertiary 
education students is more skewed towards the bottom of the income distribution, 
but due to their small number, the pattern is erratic. Regarding tertiary education 
students, a clear difference between AEI and TEI students is evident. TEI students 
are more likely to be concentrated towards the lower quintiles of the distribution, 
while AEI students are more evenly spread across the income distribution. The last 
column reports the distribution of all beneficiaries, irrespective of their educational 
level and re-iterates the point made earlier; beneficiaries are mildly over-represented 
in the lower half of the income distribution or, in other words, they are relatively 
evenly spread across the entire distribution, apart from the top quintile. Almost all 
primary and secondary education students live with their parents. However, this is 
not the case with tertiary education students. Unlike the case of students living with 
their parents, in the case of tertiary education students living away from their 
parental homes there is the broader question of whether the equivalised household 
income per capita is a good approximation of their standard of living. As the 
evidence of Table 3 shows, about one third of tertiary education students live away 
from their parental homes.2 











1 19.5 23.8 23.8  21.5  16.4 21.0 
2 21.6 22.4 18.2  28.5  19.7 22.1 
3 23.0 20.8 24.8  25.0  19.3 21.9 
4 19.4 20.1 23.5  17.1  23.1 20.0 
5 16.5 12.9 9.6  7.9 21.5 15.0 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, Own calculations. 
However, as the evidence of the table shows, while the overwhelming majority (65%) 
of TEI students that lives with their parents is located in the middle quintiles, almost 
90% of the TEI students living away from their parents belong to the bottom half of 
the income distribution and none in the top quintile. The difference between the two 
groups is even more striking in the case of AEI students. Almost two thirds of those 
living with their parents can be found in the top two quintiles, while over 80% of 
those living away from their parental homes are located in the bottom half of the 
income distribution. Typically, in most income surveys, students living away from 
their parents who do not live in collective households are treated as independent 
                                                 
2The proportion of tertiary education students who study in places other than that where their families 
live is likely to be substantially higher, but a considerable proportion of these students were interviewed 
in the houses of their families during vacation periods, while a few others live in collective households 
(student halls) and were excluded from the HBS sample.   8
units. However, as the evidence of Table 3 suggests, in our case this treatment may 
lead to misleading results regarding the distributional effects of public education 
subsidies to tertiary education students. For this reason and as a sensitivity exercise, 
we also report results excluding such students from the HBS sample.  
 
TABLE 3: Disaggregated distributions of tertiary education students 














1  16.9  31.0  21.5 7.3 32.1  16.4 
2  21.2 43.5 28.5 12.9 31.5 19.7 
3  28.3 18.0 25.0 18.0 21.5 19.3 
4  21.8  7.5 17.1 29.4 12.3 23.1 
5  11.8 0.0 7.9 32.4 2.5 21.5 
All  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, Own calculations. 
 
The results of Tables 2 and 3 provide only partial evidence on the redistributive role 
of public education subsidies, since they may be driven primarily by demographics. 
Table 4 attempts to isolate this factor. More specifically, this Table reports the relative 
ratio of actual beneficiaries to potential beneficiaries per quintile for each educational 
level. For the construction of this indicator, first the number of the quintile’s children 
who benefit from public education transfers in a particular level is divided by the 
total number of children in the corresponding age bracket (5-11 for primary; 12-17 for 
secondary and 18-24 for the rest). In the next stage, the resulting ratio of each quintile 
and educational level is divided by the corresponding national ratio. Thus, figures 
above (below) one imply that the children of the corresponding quintile are 
overrepresented (underrepresented) among the beneficiaries of public education 
transfers. 
The ratio of actual to potential beneficiaries in the case of primary education is 
almost everywhere apart from the top two quintiles close or above 1 – clearly due to 
the concentration of private education students in the top quintiles of the income 
distribution. A similar pattern is also observed in the case of secondary education, 
the only difference being that a ratio substantially less than one is only observed in 
the top quintile. Since only 4% of those aged 18-24 participates in post-secondary 
non-tertiary education, the pattern for the group is rather erratic, although there is 
evidence that the beneficiaries are relatively disproportionately concentrated in the 
bottom quintiles. In the case of TEI students, ratios above one are observed in the 
middle of the income distribution, while ratios higher than one for AEI students are 
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1 1.02  1.02  1.08  0.97  0.74 0.85 
2 1.08  1.09  0.78  1.23  0.85 0.97 
3 1.08  1.00  1.15  1.16  0.90 1.01 
4 0.98  1.02  1.18  0.86  1.16 1.06 
5 0.84  0.82  0.74  0.61  1.64 1.21 
All 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, Own calculations. 
 
4.2 The absolute and relative size of the public benefit 
 
Next Tables examine the absolute and differential magnitude of the public education 
transfers per quintile. Table 5 depicts estimates of the mean monthly transfer per 
capita for each quintile for every level of education (that is the ratio of the sum of the 
public transfers to the quintile population). In the cases of primary and secondary 
education, public transfers to the average member of the three bottom quintiles are 
higher than those received by the average member of the two top quintiles and, 
especially, the top. In the case of post secondary non tertiary education the transfers 
per capita are very modest and almost evenly spread across quintiles with the 
exception of the top one. Low average transfers per capita are also observed in the 
case of TEI transfers and they are higher for the tow lowest quintiles, while AEI 
transfers per capita are evenly spread across quintiles, with the exception of the 
bottom quintile where the value of the transfer is marginally lower. The last column 
reports the corresponding figure taking all public education transfers together. 
Unsurprisingly, taking into account the above evidence, average transfers per capita 
per quintile are not dramatically different in the case of the four lower quintiles and 
decline for the top one 
 











1 14.8  22.6  1.1 2.2 8.7 44.9 
2 16.3  21.2  0.8 2.9  10.5  46.4 
3 17.3  19.7  1.1 2.5  10.2  45.8 
4 14.7  19.0  1.1 1.7  12.3  42.9 
5 12.5  12.2  0.4 0.8  11.4  32.1 
All 15.1  19.0 0.9  2.0  10.6 42.4 
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, Own calculations. 
   10
Table 6 reports the proportional increases in the incomes of the various population 
quintiles due to the inclusion of public education transfers. In contrast with the 
previous Table, Table 6 measures the relative importance of benefits with respect the 
mean incomes of population quintiles (total education transfers/total equivalized 
disposable income per quintile). On average, households received an in-kind transfer 
of education services equal to 8.8% of their disposable income. When, we move to the 
analysis of the quintile distribution, interesting distributional patterns emerge. 
Across all educational levels, the increase in the disposable income diminishes as we 
move up to higher income quintiles. The change is most rapid in the cases of primary 
and secondary education (from 8.2% to 1.3% for primary education transfers and 
from 11.3% to 1.1% for secondary education transfers). Average increases due to 
post-secondary non-tertiary education transfers are very low, mainly because of the 
small number of IEK students. Tertiary education transfers, as a whole, cause an 
important increase in households’ disposable income (on average 1.9%). This is due 
to the impact of AEI transfers, while the impact of TEI transfer on disposable income 
is more moderate. The observed declining pattern of proportional increases per 
quintile is a sign of progressivity. 
 











1 8.2  11.3  0.5  0.9  3.2  24.0 
2 5.3  6.2  0.2  0.7  2.4  14.9 
3 4.2  4.3  0.2  0.5  1.8  11.0 
4 2.6  3.1  0.2  0.3  1.8  8.0 
5 1.3  1.1  0.0  0.1  1.0  3.5 
All 3.1 3.5 0.2 0.3 1.6 8.8 




4.3 The distributional effects of public education in Greece 
 
The redistributive effect of public education transfers is the combined force of the 
location of the beneficiaries in the income distribution and the relative size of the 
transfers. It is quantified through the use of indices of inequality that are reported in 
the following table. Table 7 examines the distributional impact of public education 
transfers per level of education on aggregate inequality; that is, it reports the 
proportional change in a number of inequality indices when we move from the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  d i s p o s a b l e  i n c o m e  t o  the distribution of disposable income 
augmented by the public transfers at the corresponding educational level. When 
moving from the distribution of disposable income to the augmented distribution of 
resources, the Gini index declines by 6.5%. The Atkinson index declines by 12.1% 
and 10.8% if inequality aversion parameter is set to 0.5 and 1.5 respectively. Almost 
the entire effect is driven by the progressive redistributive impact of primary and 
secondary education transfers. Transfers to TEI and IEK students reduce inequality,   11
but only marginally. The sign of the effect of AEI transfers depends on the index 
used. When the value of the inequality aversion parameter of the Atkinson index 
rises beyond a certain level (higher than 0.5 but lower than 1.5) inequality increases 
as a result of these transfers. The latter implies the intersection of the Lorenz curve 
for the distribution of disposable income and the Lorenz curve for augmented by 
AEI transfers income. The changes in inequality reported in Table 7 are statistically 
significant except of the changes induced by the AEI education transfers, which are 
not significant at the a=5% level. 
 
TABLE 7: Proportional changes in aggregate inequality after the inclusion 
of in-kind public transfers in the concept of resources 
























Gini  0.3217 -2.7  -3.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 -6.4 
Atkinson (e=0.5)  0.0849 -5.2  -6.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.1 -12.1 
Atkinson (e=1.5)  0.2406 -5.0  -5.3 -0.6 -0.5 0.3 -10.8 
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, Own calculations. 
 
 
4.4. Sensitivity analysis 
As noted earlier, equivalised disposable income per capita may not be a good 
indicator of the living standards of tertiary education students living away from their 
parents. Therefore, in Table 8we repeat the calculations of the main analysis after 
removing them from the sample. Taking into account that tertiary education students 
living away from their parents have low incomes and receive large public transfers, it 
is not surprising to find that their removal from the sample results in less progressive 
distributional effects of public transfers. However, since these students are not that 
many, the reported aggregate effects of the public transfers do not change 
dramatically. The Gini index declines by 6.1% instead of 6.4% and the two Atkinson 
indices by 11.5% and 10.3% instead of 12.1% and 10.8%. However, when examining 
the effects to AEI and TEI students alone, the differences in the two sets of estimates 
are quite different. This time all indices record an increase in inequality as a 
consequence of AEI transfers (from 0.3% to 0.7% depending on the choice of the 
inequality index), while the progressive effect of TEI transfers is smaller (inequality 
declines from -0.2% to -0.4% depending on the choice of the index). 
   12
TABLE 8: Proportional changes in inequality after the inclusion of in-kind public 
tertiary education transfers in the concept of resources (excl. students that live alone) 







































Gini  0.3217  -0.4  0.0  -6.4  -0.2  0.3  -6.1 
Atkinson (e=0.5) 0.0849  -0.6  -0.1  -12.1  -0.4  0.4  -11.5 
Atkinson (e=1.5) 0.2406  -0.5  0.3  -10.8  -0.3  0.7  -10.3 
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, Own calculations. 
 
Even though the results reported in previous sections are interesting, we should note 
that the sample used for the examination of the distributional impact of public 
education includes several households that are very unlikely to benefit directly from 
public education (elderly households, childless couples, etc.). For this reason, we 
repeat the analysis using two alternative approaches. The first approach isolates the 
cohorts that are most likely to have members participating in the education system 
according to the age of the household head. In this case the sample consists of all the 
households with heads aged 25-60. This sample includes the overwhelming majority 
of households with members in primary and secondary education, as well as about 
two thirds of those with members in tertiary education. The results are reported in 
Table 9. Qualitatively they do not differ substantially from the baseline results, but 
quantitatively they are stronger. The Gini index declines by 10.2% and the two 
Atkinson indices by over 18%, when we add public education transfers in the 
definition of income. The difference between these results and the corresponding 
results of baseline analysis are almost exclusively due to the transfers in the fields of 
primary and secondary education, while the redistributive effects of post-secondary 
non-tertiary and tertiary (AEI and TEI) education transfers are similar3.The second 
approach repeats the analysis on the sample of households with members aged 6-24. 
Thus, almost all the beneficiaries of public education transfers are included in the 
sample, while the overwhelming majority of the non-beneficiaries is left out of the 
picture. The results are reported in the third panel of Table 9. In quantitative terms 
the estimates are even stronger than those of the previous case (“only households 
with head aged 25-60”). The Gini index declines by 13.1% and the Atkinson around 
24% due to public education transfers. The progressive effect is again driven by 
primary and secondary education transfers, but the distributive effects of tertiary 
education transfers (as well as that of IEK) are also progressive and stronger than in 
the baseline scenario. 
 
                                                 
3As in the baseline scenario, changes in inequality due to AEI transfers are not statistically significant.   13
TABLE 9: Proportional changes in inequality due to the inclusion of in-kind public 
education transfers in the concept of resources. 

























All households (17,348) 
Gini 0.3217  -2.7  -3.4  -0.2  -0.4  0.0  -6.4 
Atkinson 
(e=0.5) 
0.0849 -5.2  -6.4  -0.4 -0.6 -0.1  -12.1 
Atkinson 
(e=1.5) 
0.2406 -5.0  -5.3  -0.6 -0.5  0.3 -10.8 
Only households with head aged 25-60 (11,415 obs.) 
Gini 0.3165  -4.3  -5.5  -0.2  -0.3  0.1  -10.2 
Atkinson 
(e=0.5) 
0.0830 -8.4 -10.0 -0.5 -0.6 -0.1  -18.8 
Atkinson 
(e=1.5) 
0.2381 -8.6  -8.9  -0.9 -0.4  0.3 -18.3 
Only households with members aged 4-24 (8,840 obs.) 
Gini 0.3093  -5.0  -6.6  -0.3  -0.6  -0.5 -13.1 
Atkinson 
(e=0.5) 
0.0795 -9.8 -12.1 -0.7 -1.1 -1.0  -24.4 
Atkinson 
(e=1.5) 
0.2269 -10.1 -10.6  -1.1  -0.8  -0.8 -24.5 
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, Own calculations. 
 
 
4.5 Overall progressivity 
Usually, progressivity indices are used in the tax literature. However, employing 
them in our framework of analysis may yield interesting results concerning the 
overall progressivity of public education transfers. For the purposes of the analysis, 
the family of distributionally sensitive Gini indices is employed, Donaldson & 
Weymark(1980). The inequality aversion parameter, v, is set at 2 (the usual Gini 
index), 3 and 4. The results are reported in Table 10. Kakwani (1977) indices are only 
examining the location of the recipients in the original income distribution. 
According to this criterion, the most progressive transfers appear to be those to post-
secondary non-tertiary education students. The transfers to secondary education 
students are also very progressive. On the other side, irrespective of the value of the 
inequality aversion parameter, the lowest progressivity is recorded in the case of AEI 
transfers. The index of Reynolds-Smolensky (1997) takes into account not only the 
location of the recipient in the original distribution but also the size of the transfer.   14
Effectively, the R-S index measures the redistributive effect. Deliberately, the index, 
as calculated in the respective columns does not take into account the resulting re-
ranking of population members that it is induced due to the transfers. The Reynolds-
Smolensky index demonstrates that the progressivity of public education transfers 
emanates from the transfers to primary and secondary education students. Transfers 
to the field of tertiary education have an inequality reducing effect, however a 
marginal one. But when the index is corrected for the effects of re-ranking [Atkinson 
(1980), Plotnick (1981)], we observe that the overall progressivity of the transfers 
declines considerably, while that of transfers to AEI students is eliminated.Indeed, 
AEI transfers induce the highest re-ranking of income units as it is revealed in the 
respective columns. 
 
TABLE 10: Indices of Progressivity 
   Kakwani  Reynolds-Smolensky  Reranking  Reynolds-Smolensky corrected 
      v=1,5     v=2.0     v=4.0     v=1.5     v=2.0     v=4.0     v=1.5     v=2.0     v=4.0     v=1.5     v=2.0     v=4.0 
Prim. 0.2467 0.3630 0.5340 0.0074 0.0109 0.0161 0.0013 0.0024 0.0051 0.0061 0.0085 0.0110 
Secon. 0.2840 0.4255 0.6552 0.0097 0.0145 0.0224 0.0019 0.0035 0.0081 0.0078 0.0111 0.0143 
IEK  0.2994 0.4436 0.6675 0.0005 0.0007 0.0011 0.0005 0.0007 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
TEI  0.2937 0.4362 0.5959 0.0009 0.0014 0.0019 0.0001 0.0003 0.0007 0.0008 0.0011 0.0013 
AEI  0.1550 0.2199 0.3248 0.0025 0.0036 0.0053 0.0021 0.0037 0.0066 0.0004 -0.0001  -0.0013 
All  0.2472 0.3655 0.5483 0.0199 0.0295 0.0442 0.0048 0.0087 0.0187 0.0151 0.0207 0.0255 
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, Own calculations. 
 
 
4.6 Changes in absolute inequality 
The standard approach in studies of the distributional effects of public transfers is to 
employ a relativist framework of inequality measurement. This is also the approach 
preferred by studies focusing on Greece, [Tsakloglou & Antoninis (1999), Antoninis 
& Tsakloglou (2001) and Callan et al. (2008)]. However popularthis treatment, may 
have a perverse effect, since in order to keep the level of inequality constant, the 
beneficiaries should receive transfers proportional to their disposable income. This is 
a rather unusual treatment that contravenes the very rationale behind of public 
transfers. At least according to the Greek constitution, each beneficiary should be 
entitled to an equal amount of public transfers. Under these circumstances, it may be 
reasonable to complement the analysis with absolute indices of inequality,Blackorby 
& Donaldson (1980). Furthermore, public education transfers are not meant to benefit 
the entire population, but particular age groups only. Therefore, in Table 11 instead 
of assuming that the benefits of public education are shared by all household 
members, it is assumed that these benefits are captured exclusively by the students 
themselves.The index used is the Gini index, although the same analysis can be 
performed using any index of inequality. The absolute index is the product of the 
relative index by the mean of the distribution. The distributions used are 
distributions of persons in particular age brackets and comparisons of the levels of 
both relative and absolute inequality before and after the transfers are made. These 
population groups are defined in such a way as to include the potential beneficiaries   15
of each level of the education system (5-11, 12-17 and 18-24 for primary, secondary 
and tertiary education, respectively). 
The lower panel of the table provides estimates of the changes in absolute inequality 
as a result of public education transfers. In case that the in-kind transfer was given to 
all the potential beneficiaries (let us assume arbitrarily to be an ideal scenario), the 
distributive impact would be neutral due to the property of translation invariance of 
the absolute indices. However drop-outs and private school students keep the 
aggregate distributional effect away from neutrality. Primary education transfers 
appear to reduce absolute inequality (by 1.2%-2.0%). This is probably due to the 
effect of private education, as there are very few dropouts in this age bracket and the 
majority of private education students who do not benefit from public education 
subsidies are located close to the top of the distribution of persons aged 5-11. On the 
contrary, public transfers to secondary education students cause a mild rise in 
absolute inequality among those aged 12-17 (except when the value of the inequality 
aversion parameter is set at 0.5) despite the fact that the great majority of private 
education students who do not benefit from public education subsidies are located 
close to the top of the distribution of persons aged 12-17, the inequality-increasing 
effect is due to the fact that the non-participation rates are substantially higher 
among the poorer rather than the richer member of this specific group. Transfers to 
tertiary education students clearly increase absolute inequality among population 
members aged 18-24; a result mainly driven by the effect of transfers to AEI students. 
The latter increase absolute inequality by 14.7%-16.4% depending on the value of the 
inequality aversion parameter. 
 
TABLE 11: Distributions of targeted population 
  5-11 12-17  18-24 
















Mean 912.5  1092.0  843.3  1099.0  843.1  1018.9  865.3  952.6 
Gini 1.5  0.2117  0.1733  0.2060  0.1573 0.2009 0.1875  0.1960 0.2040 
Gini 2.0  0.3156  0.2590  0.3105  0.2393 0.3016 0.2854  0.2949 0.3094 
Gini 4.0  0.4936  0.4076  0.4909  0.3877 0.4770 0.4593  0.4700 0.4915 
AbsGini 1.5  193.1  189.2  173.7  172.8  169.4  191.1  169.6  194.3 
AbsGini 2.0  288.0  282.8  261.9  262.9  254.3  290.8  255.2  294.7 
AbsGini 4.0  450.4  445.1  414.0  426.1  402.2  467.9  406.7  468.2 
Proportional Changes 
Gini 1.5    -18.1%    -23.6%    -6.7%  -2.4%  1.5% 
Gini 2.0    -18.0%    -22.9%    -5.4%  -2.2%  2.6% 
Gini 4.0    -17.4%    -21.0%    -3.7%  -1.5%  3.0% 
AbsGini 1.5    -2.0%    -0.5%    12.8%  0.1%  14.7% 
AbsGini 2.0    -1.8%    0.4%    14.3%  0.4%  15.9% 
AbsGini 4.0    -1.2%    2.9%    16.4%  1.1%  16.4% 
A: Distribution of equivalised disposable income (persons aged 5-11), B: Distribution of equivalised 
disposable income plus education transfers (5-11), A1: Distribution of equivalised disposable income 
(persons aged 12-17), B1: Distribution of equivalised disposable income plus education transfers (12-17), 
A2: Distribution of equivalised disposable income (persons aged 18-24), B2: Distribution of equivalised 
disposable income plus education transfers (18-24), C: Distribution of equivalised disposable income 
plus TEI education transfers (only aged 18-24), D: Distribution of equivalised disposable income plus 
AEI education transfers (18-24)   16
 
5. The case of a graduate tax 
The results of our analysis show that the distribution of in-kind tertiary education 
transfers are neutral in the baseline scenario or regressive under the very plausible 
scenario of excluding tertiary students that study away from their parental home 
from the analysis. The same transfers were also found inequality increasing if a 
framework of absolute inequality is employed. These results provide evidence of the 
presence of education inequalities. Furthermore, these inequities that could be 
responsible for generating unequal outcomes through the operation of labor markets 
and on the long run result to the intergenerational transmission of inequalities if we 
assume that the education and the income of the parents are associated with the 
education of their offspring.Graphs 1 and 2 that show the distribution of tertiary 
graduates (entire population, aged bellow 65, respectively) per quintile confirm the 
f a v o u r a b l e  p o s i t i o n  o f  p e o p l e  w i t h  h i g h er education qualification in the income 
distribution. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of tertiary education graduates per quintile 
 
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, Own calculations. 
As the figure 1 indicates and the following figure 2 further confirms, tertiary 
education graduates are heavily concentrated at the upper part of the distribution. 
This pattern is especially striking for AEI graduates, over half of the university 
graduates are located at the top quintile. In contrast, graduates are very under-
presented at the bottom part of the distribution.  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of tertiary education graduates aged under 65 per quintile 
   17
Source: Greek Household Budget Survey, Own calculations. 
 
In order to correct partly the regressive effect of higher education in the income 
distribution, we examine the idea of a progressive graduate tax. The notion of a 
graduate tax is not new. Its origins are found in Friedman & Kuznets (1945) who 
suggested that if individuals issued equity shares of their human capital, then they 
could finance their professional education. More recently the graduate tax was 
examined by Barr (2004), Barr & Crawford (2005) and others. 
Under a graduate tax scheme, graduates pay a special tax in order to cover part of 
the cost of the tertiary qualifications, they received. The tax takes the form of a 
supplementary tax rate, which is imposed to graduates’ income only. The repayment 
rearrangements are such that the students don’t pay anything while they are 
studying, but only after their graduation, when they also enjoy the financial benefits 
of their tertiary qualifications. Moreover the repayments are made via the tax system 
and consequently they are linked to graduates’ ability to pay. Our approach involves 
the imposition of a simulated tax on the current stock of graduates, treating the 
scheme as if it had been in work for several years already. 
 
The policy simulations were implemented using the EUROMOD4 model. We model 
the graduate tax as an increase in the existing income tax rates according to different 
policy scenarios. Across simulations we differentiate the level of the tax rate increase, 
as well as whether the same rate increase will be applied to AEI and TEI graduates or 
not. The graduate tax scheme implemented in this section is open-ended. This means 
that the graduate tax is payable by all graduates whose taxable income is above the 
tax threshold. Policy simulations 1a, 1b, 1c do not distinguish between TEI and AEI 
graduates; the same tax rate increase is imposed to all. On the other hand, 
simulations 2a, 2b, 2c apply lower graduates’ tax rates on TEI graduates on the basis 
that their cost of tuition is significantly lower5 and finally simulations 3a, 3b, 3c are a 
more “extreme” variant of the simulations 2a, 2b, 2c in the sense that TEI graduates 
are excluded from the paying population. The supplementary rates were added to 
the existing tax rates of each income bracket of the tax schedule. For example, 
whereas the marginal income tax rates in 2004 were 15%, 30% and 40%, they are 
increased to 16%, 31% and 41% for simulation 1a and similarly for other simulations. 
Our baseline scenario assumes that the graduate tax is imposed on all incomes. 
Having applied the supplementary tax rates on the current stock of graduates, we 
now turn to evaluate the first round fiscal and distributional impact of the tax. 
Firstly, the Table 12 provides estimates of the fiscal effects that would be induced by 
the graduate tax scheme. Additional tax revenues are reported as a percentage of 
disposable income, income tax revenues and public expenditure in tertiary 
education. 
 
                                                 
4EUROMOD is a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European Union (EU) that enables 
researchers and policy analysts to calculate, in a comparable manner, the effects of taxes and benefits on 
household incomes and work incentives for the population of each country and for the EU as a whole. 
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/euromod 
5See Table 1; “The cost structure of Greek education system”.   18
TABLE 12: Fiscal and Distributional Effects of a Graduate Scheme 








As % of 
disposable 
income 













1a 1%  1%  0.13% 1.70%  6.10% -0.18  -0.34  -0.21 
1b 2%  2%  0.26% 3.40% 12.20%  -0.37  -0.68  -0.43 
1c 3%  3%  0.38% 5.10% 18.30%  -0.55  -1.02  -0.64 
2a 1%  0.5%  0.12% 1.60%  5.60% -0.17  -0.32  -0.20 
2b 2%  1%  0.23% 3.10% 11.10%  -0.34  -0.64  -0.40 
2c 3%  1.5%  0.35% 4.70% 16.70%  -0.51  -0.96  -0.59 
3a 1%  0%  0.11% 1.40%  5.00% -0.16  -0.30  -0.18 
3b 2%  0%  0.21% 2.80% 10.10%  -0.31  -0.60  -0.36 
3c 3%  0%  0.32% 4.20% 15.10%  -0.47  -0.89  -0.54 
Source: Greek version of Euromod model. 
As one might expect, graduate tax revenues represent a small part of disposable 
income, but a larger of total income tax revenues. Across all simulations their relative 
size varies from 0.13% to 0.38% of disposable income and from 1.7% to 5.1% of total 
income tax revenues. The latter figure can be attributed to the fact that the graduate 
tax is imposed mostly on relatively affluent taxpayers. Nevertheless, the main aim of 
the graduate tax is to cover part of the public tertiary education expenditures. The 
respective column of the Table shows that it can cover a considerable part of public 
tertiary education expenditures. The share of public tertiary expenditure covered 
varies from 5% to 18.3% across the various simulations. Estimates of simulation 1c 
(that impose the highest graduate tax rate) demonstrate that graduate taxes could 
cover up to 18.3% of public tertiary education expenditures. However changes in 
policy parameters that are not marginal (as it is the case of simulation 1c) should be 
interpreted with caution, for they neglect behavioural responses. Furthermore, these 
effects depend on the elasticity of labor supply and remain a question of empirical 
investigation.  
The comparison of simulations 1a, 1b, 1c with 2a, 2b and 2c and especially 3a, 3b 3c 
reveals the dependence of graduate tax revenues on AEI graduates. When we impose 
a lower graduate tax rate or even exclude TEI graduates from the paying population, 
then the reduction in revenues is relatively small. For example, if we impose a 1% 
graduate tax only to AEI graduates, then the graduate tax revenues as a proportion 
of public expenditure in tertiary education decrease only from 6.1% to 5.0%. This is 
due the fact that AEI graduates are located higher in the income distribution than the 
TEI graduates. Yet, as we noted earlier the share of current tertiary education 
students is substantially higher than the corresponding share of earlier generations of 
tertiary education students. Hence, it may be expected that the graduate revenues 
will increase as the number of graduates that enter in the scheme is higher than the 
number of graduates that exit. Finally, the Table reports the quantitative estimates of 
the short–run distributional effects of a graduate tax. Across all simulations 
aggregate inequality decreases mildly due to the tax. The higher the graduate tax rate 
we impose, the larger the measured redistributive effect (for example, when we   19
impose a 3% graduate tax on all graduates the Gini index declines by about -0.55% 
and the two Atkinson by -1.02% and -0.64%, respectively). When we differentiate the 
tax rates for AEI and TEI graduates the redistributive effect becomes milder. 
However, it should be noted that the effect of excluding TEI graduates (or taxing 
them at a smaller rate) on inequality is very small. Interestingly, the largest declines 
in inequality are recorded when the index used is the Atkinson (e=0.5). This is 
because this index is relatively more sensitive to changes that occur close to the top 
of the distribution. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Our findings show that in-kind public education transfers in Greece lead to a 
significant decline in aggregate inequality. This equalizing effect is mainly the result 
of public transfers to primary and secondary education students, while transfers to 
post-secondary non-tertiary (IEK) and TEI students affect aggregate inequality very 
mildly (nevertheless, progressively). The effect of transfers to University (AEI) 
students depended on the methodological treatment of students living away from 
their parents. Overall, the main analysis showed that the distributional effect of those 
transfers is ambiguous, however under the plausible assumption of excluding 
students that live away from parental homes, we found that their effect is mildly 
regressive. Another interesting result of the study was the adoption of an absolutist 
perspective to inequality. Whereas the majority of distributional studies rely on a 
relative concept of inequality, we believe that an absolute inequality framework 
makes sense in the context of publicly provided services such as public education 
services. For the purposes of the analysis, we confined the estimation to the 
distributions of potential beneficiaries and we found that only primary education 
transfers decrease absolute inequality (as measured by the absolute parametric Gini). 
Secondary education transfers increase absolute inequality, whereas tertiary 
education transfers appear to be regressive.  
The results could be even more interesting, had we access to information about the 
disaggregated costs of tertiary education institutions. Costs per student vary widely 
across tertiary education institutions and faculties and there is evidence that students 
that belong to high income segments of the population are over-represented in the 
faculties with the highest cost per student, such as medicine and engineering, 
Chryssakis & Soulis (2001). Hence, it is likely that the use of more disaggregated data 
regarding education could have produced even stronger inequality increasing results 
with respect to AEI transfers.  
In the light of this evidence, a number of policies designed to mitigate such 
unwanted distributional effects are desirable. An improvement of the distributional 
performance of the public tertiary education in Greece is likely to be the by-product 
of the improvement of the progressivity of public post-compulsory secondary 
education. Students from poor households who reach the entrance examinations are 
less likely to succeed than students from rich households, therefore students from 
richer households are over-represented in tertiary education. Hence, policies aimed 
to address these inequities - such as the provision of grants and other incentives to 
students from poor households in order to stay in education after the completion of 
compulsory education could improve at the same time the distributional impact of 
both upper secondary and tertiary public education.   20
Another alternative regards the financing of tertiary education via the imposition of 
a graduate tax. This tax attempts to correct ex ante the produced inequities of the 
system. Since the children of better-off families are over-represented in tertiary 
education and moreover, from a dynamic point of view, tertiary education graduates 
are likely to enjoy substantially higher life-time incomes than the rest of the 
population, such a policy is likely to improve the long-term distributional impact of 
public education. Nevertheless, a graduate tax scheme is not without limitations. It 
may act as a deterrent to potential students or to implicitly subsidize tax evading 
households. Yet, costs may be minimized via the appropriate design and a graduate 
tax may be worth considering for its distributional and fiscal properties. Hence, we 
considered the distributional and fiscal consequences of a graduate tax in Greece 
using the EUROMOD Microsimulation model. According to our estimates this policy 
reform is not only inequality-reducing, but also can cover a significant part of the 
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